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II. STATEMENT OF THE CASE
A.

Nature of the Case
This is an appeal from the district court’s judgment on remand dismissing

Appellant Kenneth Thurlow’s petition for post-conviction relief.
B.

General Course of Proceedings
In August 2005, Kenneth Thurlow and Christopher Lewers went to a

junkyard where the victim was working on his vehicle. State v. Thurlow, 152 Idaho
256, 257, 269 P.3d 813, 814 (Ct. App. 2011). The victim died after being shot in the
head and Mr. Thurlow was charged with first degree murder and Mr. Lewers was
charged with being the accessory. Id.
In late May 2006, trial counsel visited Mr. Thurlow at the jail to discuss an
offer, which he understood to involve a plea to second degree murder and a sentence
of ten years fixed. Tr. p. 7, ln. 17 - p. 8, ln. 20. They discussed the offer for about
fifteen minutes during which trial counsel advised that the offer would be open for a
very short time period. Tr. p. 8, ln. 21 - p. 10, ln 16. Trial counsel advised that Mr.
Lewers would also have to accept the deal, which she opined was unlikely. Tr. p. 10,
ln. 3-24; p 54, ln. 19-25. Mr. Thurlow concluded that “the offer was there but it
wasn't an offer” because Mr. Lewers was not going to accept it. Tr. p. 11, ln. 2-10.
Trial counsel testified that she attempted to explain to Mr. Thurlow that she
believed he would be convicted of at least felony murder, that the offer was decent
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and that “we'd try to take it.” Tr. p. 56, ln. 3-10; p. 47, ln. 25 - p. 48, ln. 2.
Unfortunately, Mr. Thurlow understood trial counsel to advise that the jury would
find him guilty of an accessory offense that carried a five-year penalty. Tr. p. 8, ln.
21 - p. 10, ln 2; p. 11, ln. 11-16; p. 13, ln. 2-5; p. 27, ln. 4-8. Mr. Thurlow thus
understood counsel to advise that he was better off going to trial. Tr. p. 16, ln. 1-13.
p. 32, ln. 12 - p. 33, ln. 2. Mr. Thurlow corroborated trial counsel’s indication that
she believed he would be found guilty of accessory after the fact with a note that
trial counsel sent just before trial. Specifically, trial counsel sent a printout of Idaho
Code § 18-205 printed on September 11, 2006, which defines the crime of accessory
after the fact with a handwritten note from trial counsel, which read:
This is the crime I believe you would/will be found guilty of if we go to trial.
Maximum penalty is 5 yrs. State v. Barnes is attached. It is a Bonner Co. case
[and] explains how little a person has to do to become an accessory after the fact.
Thought you might be interested.
Petitioner’s Exhibit A.
Having understood trial counsel to advise he was better off going to trial, Mr.
Thurlow rejected the offer. The case went to trial on September 18, 2006 and the
jury found Mr. Thurlow guilty of first-degree murder. Thurlow v. State, No. 42763,
2016 WL 4920377, at *1 (Idaho Ct. App. Sept. 12, 2016). The district court imposed
a determinate life term, noting in part Mr. Thurlow denied culpability in his
participation in the crime, which demonstrated little potential for rehabilitation.
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Thurlow, 152 Idaho at 260, 269 P.3d at 817. The Court of Appeals affirmed Mr.
Thurlow’s conviction and sentence. Id. Mr. Lewers pled guilty to first-degree
murder and was sentenced to a unified term of life with a minimum period of
confinement of twenty years. Tr. p. 34, ln. 7-23.
Mr. Thurlow filed a pro se petition for post-conviction relief and affidavit,
alleging his trial counsel was ineffective because she failed to provide him with
accurate information during plea bargaining. Thurlow, No. 42763, 2016 WL
4920377, at *1. Mr. Thurlow turned down the state's plea offer because his trial
counsel advised him that he would be convicted of accessory after the fact if he went
to trial. Id. The district court granted the state's motion for summary dismissal,
finding no evidence that disputed his trial counsel's deposition testimony regarding
her performance. Id. The Court of Appeals reversed, concluding there were genuine
issues of material fact regarding trial counsel's ineffective assistance of counsel in
the plea bargaining process. Id. at *4.
On remand, Mr. Thrulow and trial counsel testified at an evidentiary
hearing. The district court found it was unnecessary to resolve any conflict between
the two witnesses’ testimony because neither witness’s testimony established a
shortcoming capable of objective evaluation with respect to trial counsel’s advice
during plea negotiations. R Vol. IV 660. The district court also found that Mr.
Thurlow did not establish a reasonable probability that he would have accepted the
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offer. Id. The district court thus dismissed Mr. Thurlow’s petition for post-conviction
relief. R Vol. IV 664. This appeal follows.
III. ISSUE PRESENTED ON APPEAL
1.

Did the district court err in dismissing Mr. Thurlow’s petition for post-

conviction relief because he established that trial counsel was ineffective?
IV. ARGUMENT
The Sixth Amendment guarantees a defendant the effective assistance of
counsel during plea negotiations. Lee v. United States, 137 S. Ct. 1958, 1964 (2017);
Lafler v. Cooper, 566 U.S. 156, 165 (2012); Fortin v. State, 160 Idaho 437, 445–46,
374 P.3d 600, 608–09 (Ct. App. 2016). If counsel’s deficient performance causes a
defendant to reject a plea bargain, prejudice is established when loss of the plea
opportunity led to a trial resulting in a conviction and the imposition of a more
severe sentence.” Lafler, 566 U.S. at 168; Fortin, 160 Idaho at 445–46, 374 P.3d at
608–09.
Here, the district court found that “even assuming arguendo” that trial
counsel encouraged Mr. Thurlow to go to trial “this is a strategic or tactical decision
made by trial counsel which may not be second guessed unless that decision was”
based on inadequate preparation, ignorance of the relevant law, or other
shortcomings capable of objective evaluation.” Vol. IV, 661. The district court
further concluded that neither Mr. Thurlow’s nor trial counsel’s testimony
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established any such shortcoming. The district court also found that insufficient
evidence established “a reasonable probability that Thurlow would have accepted
the plea offer but for his discussion with Payne in late May/early June 2006”
because the plea offer had long since expired when trial counsel sent the accessory
note and the state never offered a plea deal involving accessory after the fact and
five years. R. Vol. IV 662.
The district court’s reasoning is erroneous for several reasons. First, the
decision to accept a plea offer is not a strategic choice within counsel’s realm but,
instead, a decision for the client following competent advice of counsel. Further, Mr.
Thurlow’s testimony that trial counsel advised him to reject the plea offer because
he would be found guilty of a five year offense establishes deficient performance.
Finally, even crediting trial counsel’s testimony that she advised Mr. Thurlow to
accept the plea offer, the record establishes that she nonetheless failed in her
essential duty to sufficiently explain the plea offer and ensure that Mr. Thurlow
understood its terms. Counsel’s deficient performance caused Mr. Thurlow to lose
the opportunity to accept the plea deal, which resulted in his conviction to first
degree murder and sentence to life without parole. Accordingly, this Court should
reverse the judgment on remand and remand with instruction to grant Mr.
Thurlow’s petition for post-conviction relief.
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A.

Standard of Review
A petitioner prevails in a post-conviction proceeding by proving the

allegations by a preponderance of the evidence. I.C. § 19–4907; Stuart v. State, 118
Idaho 865, 869, 801 P.2d 1216, 1220 (1990); Cook v. State, 157 Idaho 775, 777, 339
P.3d 1179, 1181 (Ct. App. 2014). When reviewing a decision after an evidentiary
hearing, an appellate court will disturb the lower court's factual findings when they
are clearly erroneous. I.R.C.P. 52(a); Cook, 157 Idaho at 777, 339 P.3d at 1181;
Russell v. State, 118 Idaho 65, 67, 794 P.2d 654, 656 (Ct. App. 1990). This Court
freely reviews the district court's application of the relevant law to the facts. Cook,
157 Idaho at 777, 339 P.3d at 1181; Nellsch v. State, 122 Idaho 426, 434, 835 P.2d
661, 669 (Ct. App.1 992).
B.

The Decision To Go To Trial Is Not Strategic And Counsel Had A
Duty To Provide Accurate Advice To A Client Contemplating A Plea
Deal
The American Bar Association (ABA) standards often reflect prevailing

norms of practice and are guides in determining the nature and extent of trial
counsel’s duties. Murphy v. State, 143 Idaho 139, 146, 139 P.3d 741, 748 (Ct. App.
2006). The ABA Standards identify whether to accept a plea offer as a decision
“ultimately to be made by a competent client, after full consultation with defense
counsel.” ABA Standards for Criminal Justice, The Defense Function, 4-5.2(b)(iii);
see also IRCP 1.2(a) (In a criminal case, the lawyer shall abide by the client's
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decision, after consultation with the lawyer, as to a plea to be entered, whether to
waive jury trial and whether the client will testify).
Conversely, strategic and tactical decisions include how to craft and respond
to motions, how to pursue plea negotiations, and, at hearing or trial, what witnesses
to call, whether and how to conduct cross-examination, what jurors to accept or
strike, what motions and objections should be made, what stipulations if any to
agree to, and what and how evidence should be introduced. ABA Standards,
4-5.2(d), 4-5.1(f). Defense counsel should not intentionally understate or overstate
the risks, hazards, or prospects of the case or exert undue influence on the client’s
decisions regarding a plea.
Trial counsel had a duty to provide reasonably competent advice regarding
the plea offer. Mr. Thurlow’s testified that trial counsel advised him to reject the
plea offer for a ten year sentence because he probably would be found guilty of an
accessory offense, which carried a five year penalty. Such advice could only have
been made after an inadequate review of the state’s evidence or ignorance of the
relevant law. Similarly, in Lafler, defense counsel erroneously advised the
defendant that the prosecution could not prove a required element of the charged
offense and the defendant relied on this advice in rejecting two plea offers and
proceeding to trial. He was subsequently convicted of all counts and received a less
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favorable sentence than he would have under the plea offers. On appeal, the parties
conceded that trial counsel’s performance was deficient.
It was objectively unreasonable for trial counsel to advise Mr. Thurlow to
reject the offer because he was better off at trial. The district court erred in finding
that Mr. Thurlow’s testimony did not establish deficient performance.
C.

Trial Counsel Performed Deficiently
In addition to providing accurate advice, defense counsel has a duty to ensure

that the client understands any proposed disposition agreement, including its direct
and possible collateral consequences. ABA Standards for Criminal Justice, The
Defense Function§ 4-6.2 (c) Defense counsel should use language and means that
the client is able to understand, which may require special attention when the
client is a minor, elderly, or suffering from a mental impairment or other disability.
ABA, § 4-3.1(d).
Here, trial counsel spent about fifteen minutes discussing the offer with Mr.
Thurlow at the jail in a visiting area where each sat on opposite sides of a glass
barrier and spoke through phones. Tr. p. 8, ln. 21 - p. 10, ln. 2; p. 55, ln. 1-12. Mr.
Thurlow was inexperienced with the law and legal system and trial counsel was his
first attorney. Tr. p. 14, ln. 2-11. Mr. Thurlow also suffered from mental health
issues and drug addiction. Thurlow, 152 Idaho at 261, 269 P.3d at 818.
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Trial counsel may have intended to explain to Mr. Thurlow he was just as
culpable if only an accessory, but that is not what Mr. Thurlow understood. Instead,
Mr. Thurlow understood trial counsel to be telling him he was better off going to
trial because he would probably be found guilty of an accessory offense that only
carried five years. Tr. p. 13, ln. 19 - p. 14, ln. 1.
Counsel had a duty to take reasonable measures to ensure that Mr. Thurlow
understood her advice. Especially presented with Mr. Thurlow’s illogical reaction to
the advice she intended to give, it was objectively unreasonable to limit the
consultation to fifteen minutes and fail to take additional steps to help MR.
Thurlow understand the ramifications of accepting versus rejecting the plea offer.
D.

Mr. Thurlow Was Prejudiced By Counsel’s Deficient Performance
Where trial counsel’s deficient advice led to the plea offer's rejection, the

petitioner is required to show that, but for the ineffective advice of counsel, there is
a reasonable probability that: (1) the plea offer would have been presented to the
court (i.e., that the defendant would have accepted the plea and the prosecution
would not have withdrawn it in light of intervening circumstances); (2) the court
would have accepted its terms; and (3) the conviction or sentence, or both, under the
offer's terms would have been less severe than under the judgment and sentence
that in fact were imposed. Lafler, 566 U.S. at 164; Fortin, 160 Idaho at 445–46, 374
P.3d at 608–09.
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Mr. Thurlow expressed an early interest in negotiations with the state and
took two polygraphs in effort to establish that Mr. Thurlow did not shoot the victim.
Tr. p. 22, ln. 2-13. Mr. Thurlow like and respected trial counsel and trusted her
advice. Tr. p. 14, ln. 17 - p. 15, ln. 6. p. 62, ln. 9-17.
Had counsel performed effectively by ensuring that Mr. Thurlow correctly
understood the risks of trial and the law surrounding accessories, there is a
reasonable probability he would have accepted the offer. There is no reason to
conclude the district court would not have accepted its terms. Further, that Mr.
Lewers was sentenced to a minimum period of confinement of twenty years strongly
supports that Mr. Thurlow would have likewise received less than a determinate
life term had he plead guilty.
The district court found that insufficient evidence established “a reasonable
probability that Thurlow would have accepted the plea offer but for his discussion
with Payne in late May/early June 2006” because the plea offer had long since
expired when trial counsel sent the accessory note and the state never offered a plea
deal involving accessory after the fact and five years. R Vol. IV 662. The district
court misconstrued the significance of the accessory note.
Mr. Thurlow testified that trial counsel advised him that she believed he
would be found guilty of accessory after the fact, which carried a penalty of five
years, while discussing the plea offer in June. Tr. p. 11, ln. 11-16. Mr. Thurlow
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indicated that the information reflected in the “accessory note,” which came just
before trial in September, was the same information he understood during the June
meeting.
Mr. Thurlow was interested in pleading guilty and trusted his attorney. Had
trial counsel advised Mr. Thurlow competently (or took reasonable measures that
Mr. Thurlow accurately understood her advice), he certainly would have accepted
the plea offer. The district court would have accepted the plea and in all likelihood
sentenced Mr. Thurlow to a significantly lower determinate term. Mr. Thrulow
therefore established that he was prejudiced by counsel’s deficient performance.
IV. CONCLUSION
Mr. Thurlow established that he received ineffective assistance of counsel
during plea negotiations. Accordingly, this Court should reverse the district court’s
judgment on remand dismissing Mr. Thurlow’s petition and remand with
instruction for the state to re-offer the plea agreement.
Respectfully submitted this 24th day of October 2017.
FYFFE LAW

/s/ Robyn Fyffe
ROBYN FYFFE
Attorney for Kenneth Thurlow
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